China's trade with five Central Asian countries hit a record in 2025 — and the relationship has moved well beyond buying and selling. Chinese companies are now partners in strategic projects across high-tech industries including energy and mining.
China’s trade with Central Asian states grew significantly during the first 10 months of 2025, compared with the same period in 2024, according to Chinese government statistics.
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Although state statistics from the countries in the region show significant discrepancies and are not overly reliable due to illicit trade along the long borders, common denominator is that the trade grew at the pace not seen before.
China emerged as the leading trade partner for Central Asia at the beginning of 2020s, surpassing Russia, notably after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but last year’s double digit growth in trade cemented that status.
According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, trade between China and Central Asian countries reached $106.3 billion. That is 12 percent increase year on year and outpacing 2024 growth by six percentage points.
Exports from China totaled $71.2 billion, with imports of $35.1 billion.
Data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce show that the highest growth was seen in Kyrgyzstan, from $17.4 billion to $23.6 billion. Trade with Kazakhstan grew from $36.5 billion to $39.8 billion; Uzbekistan from $11.1 billion to $12.9 billion, and Tajikistan from $3.3 billion to $3.5 billion.
Parallel to the trade, Chinese investment grew steadily and Central Asia is now second only to Africa in the amount of Chinese funds flowing into the economy.
The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) said in its report that China's cumulative investments in Central Asian countries had reached $35.9 billion by mid-2025, a 1.5-fold increase since 2020. The growth over the past 18 months topped $7.4 billion which is a 13% increase.
Kazakhstan leads with accumulated investments of $11.4 billion (32% of the portfolio), followed by Uzbekistan with $10.7 billion (30%), Turkmenistan with $9.5 billion (27%), Tajikistan with $2.2 billion (6%) and Kyrgyzstan with $2.1 billion (5.8%).
Strategy behind trade statistics
China exported machinery, electronics and high-tech products to Central Asia, while imports were a more diverse mix of chemicals, steel and agricultural goods. In investment, most of the Chinese driven projects were in the green energy projects, especially in Uzbekistan and in processing of extraction industry production, especially in Kazakhstan.
“An important fact is that a qualitative shift is taking place in the structure of Chinese investment. The share of extractive industries has fallen to 54%, while manufacturing and energy now account for more than a third of the regional portfolio," says Taisiya Marmontova, President of the Public Foundation “Regional Integration Research Institute.”
"The share of greenfield projects has grown to 60%, demonstrating the technological maturity of Chinese investors and an improving investment climate in the region. The largest projects for 2024–2025 reflect China's transition from simple raw material exports to advanced processing and the creation of an industrial base in Central Asia, primarily in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.”
Many of those projects were started under the Chinese Belt and Road initiative as well as the China – Central Asia political format which, unlike the other similar formats, with Russia, EU or USA, has been formalised with Permanent Secretariat in Xi’an that coordinates joint projects and their political and administrative framework. Especially in transport, which was at the core of the Belt and Road since its inception.
New transport agreements along the southern Middle Corridor signal China’s growing strategic aim to reroute Eurasian transit through Iran and Turkey, expanding its influence across the region.
In November last year China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey signed a multilateral agreement in Istanbul aimed at expanding rail freight movement along the southern branch of the Eurasian transit corridor. The deal also included Iran as the final destination of the southern branch of the corridor, connecting China and Central Asia to the Persian Gulf.
The countries agreed to apply unified and competitive tariffs, shorten travel times for container trains, cut auxiliary and customs-related costs, and upgrade rail infrastructure across the corridor.
It should make the southern corridor feasibly able to take over some of the rail trade between China and Europe since it is growing steadily. Last year it was close to 60 million tons carried by as many as 20,000 freight trains.
“Following the pandemic and amid geopolitical tensions, China has accelerated the creation of sustainable land routes and legal frameworks for cooperation. China is consistently developing its Belt and Road Initiative. Market incentives for cooperation are that businesses are focusing on the following components: raw materials/energy, rapid demand growth, and unfinished infrastructure. Central Asia is precisely such a region, and Chinese capital is seeing this more quickly than others,” says Rasul Rysmambetov, head of the National Analytical Center at Nazarbayev University.
“China is now making progress in industrial cooperation by shifting some value chains closer to raw materials, electricity, and transit routes. At the regional level, this means projects in processing, energy, metals, construction materials, and mechanical engineering. I see Chinese companies beginning to inquire about the prices of associated resources for production—energy, water, and logistics. In this sense, Central Asia has outgrown the status of a mere sales market,” says Rysmambetov.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan received the most investments from China - $11.4 billion or around a third of the country's total investments in the region - the main investors being China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a company which produces, processes and transports oil and has a chain of gas stations, and Sinopec, an oil producer participating in a project to produce polyethylene.
A new, $300 million seaport will be constructed in Aktau, a city on the Caspian Sea, with China’s Zhongyun International confirmed as the strategic partner, Mangistau Region Governor Nurdaulet Kilybay announced. Aktau is a major hub of the Middle Corridor that connects China and Europe.
The Green Aluminum Complex planned by East Hope in Kazakhstan is a flagship industrial project designed to produce aluminum with the lowest possible carbon footprint through the use of relatively clean energy and modern technologies.
This project is an important step for Kazakhstan toward becoming a regional hub for bauxite processing and electrolytic aluminum, and for China, it represents an opportunity to diversify its supply sources for this important metal.
In 2024, a $1.5 billion agreement was signed between KAZ Minerals Smelting LLP, China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Foreign Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. (NFC), and NFC Kazakhstan LLP to build a copper smelter. The large-scale copper smelter will cement the country's role as a key player in the copper market, which remains a key metal for the green transition and digital infrastructure.
The project is important not only as a source of exports: it also spurred the development of related clusters and strengthens the industrial connectivity of Central Kazakhstan.
“Such projects strengthen Kazakhstan's technological ties with Chinese companies. Beijing brings not only capital but also engineering, EPC contracting, and access to its own markets for finished products. The gas chemicals industry is becoming one of the indicators of China's maturing presence, as we see a shift in interest from pipelines to complex processing,” says Marmontova.
Uzbekistan
China is no longer just Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner. By 2023, China had also emerged as the key partner in investment, and business activity. By the end of 2025, the conversation had shifted away from who ranks first to the scale and depth of engagement.
Bilateral trade turnover between Uzbekistan and China reached $17.2 billion, marking a 36% increase, according to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, trade and industry.
As for business presence, Uzbekistan hosts 5,044 companies with Chinese capital, a 50.2% increase year-on-year. In contrast, the number of companies with Russian participation grew by 8%, and those with Turkish participation by 17%.
The most dramatic growth in economic relations has been in investment and lending, China’s share has approached 40%, exceeding the combined scale of Russian and Turkish involvement by several times. In 2017 the Chinese investments were estimated at around $500 million, by 2025 they had reached $15.5 billion.
“Uzbekistan’s open economic policy in recent years and the creation of favorable conditions for investors have played a decisive role. Political guarantees provided at the highest level, including by the country’s leadership, and — most importantly — the protection of investments have strengthened investor confidence,” says Farhod Karimov, political scientist and Deputy Rector at Westminster International University in Tashkent.
“The Chinese entities have seen that cooperation is based not on short-term or one-off contracts, but on long-term strategic partnership agreements. Uzbekistan is not seeking investment merely to address temporary challenges; it is offering sustained political and legal guarantees.
And finally, Uzbekistan’s economy has been growing at a high pace year after year, while population growth is expanding the domestic market. A growing population means more consumers, higher demand for goods and services, and increasing purchasing power,” says Karimov.
Chinese companies are building three photo-voltaic fields in different regions of Uzbekistan with combined power of more than 1000 MW.
One of the key interregional projects is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which ranks among the largest infrastructure initiatives in Central Asia.
Uzbekistan’s space agency Uzcosmos has contracted Chinese space technology company Star.Vision to launch a satellite in 2026 that will be used by Uzbekistan to monitor crops and climate conditions.
The number of Chinese tourists visiting Uzbekistan skyrocketed to nearly 218,000 during the first 10 months of 2025, up from about 58,000 in the same period of 2024, according to Uzbek official statistics. This number is expected to grow as the two countries reached the agreement on short visa-free travel.
The first cargo flight between China’s Wenzhou and Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent took place on November 24. The flight left Wenzhou Longwan International Airport carrying 50 tons of goods linked to cross-border e-commerce.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has seen the most significant year on year trade growth with China, according to Chinese official statistics. What is interesting about it is that the government in Bishkek put the total 2025 GDP at $16.3 billion. If we see the registered trade with China rose to $26.3 billion in the same year, it means that the trade with China surpasses what the country produces itself.
Kyrgyzstan trails its neighbours in the amount of FDIs from China. Still, significant investments are being made in infrastructure, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and, potentially, the "Manas" logistics city.
It is worth saying that the country has seen disturbances and local population clashing with Chinese workers, protesting the Chinese practice of bringing their own labour instead of creating local employment.
“Indeed, we've welcomed a large Chinese citizen community because major projects have emerged and investments have been made. In particular, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. Once completed, this project will generate up to $500 million in annual budget revenue from transit alone. That's why we're attracting workers because the projects are under construction. It must be acknowledged that our citizens aren't yet ready to construct very tall buildings with high quality and in a short timeframe. Such projects haven't been built before,” said Kamchybek Tashiev, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s powerful State Committee for National Security in a reaction to fights among Kyrgyz and Chinese workers.
Tajikistan
China's direct investments in Tajikistan's economy totaled $294.1 million in 2025 and made up 57.7% of the total volume from all countries in the period, the State Committee on Investments and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan reported.
Tajikistan’s turnover with China rose 12 percent in 2025 to $4.3 billion, according to Chinese customs statistics; Tajik imports reached $3.7 billion and exports were limited to $560 million. Tajikistan’s customs agency released somewhat different data.
In all the countries of Central Asia, significant discrepancies in trade statistics are constant. Those are attributed to poor registration of goods at the border crossings or outright smuggling.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is the only country of Central Asia whose trade with China declined year on year. If fell by 5.6 percent to $10 billion. But it is also the only country in the region that can boast the trade surplus with China.
Exports were $8.4 billion, while imports rose 55 percent over 2024’s total to $1.6 billion. This is mainly owing to the export of natural gas to China. However, since that export decreased last year, Turkmenistan passed its title of China’s biggest natural gas supplier to Russia.
Why do Central Asian states increasingly choose China over other partners and should they be worried about growing economic influence of Beijing?
“Central Asia isn't becoming someone's exclusive zone, that's a rather simplistic view. The Marshall Plan (Europe Restoration Programme) didn't make Europe dependent on the US. It's just that the region is becoming a field for competing models. China is growing rapidly now because our interests—corridors, energy, industrialization, and financing—have aligned. But in the long term, projects with greater local added value and better institutions will ultimately win,” says Rasul Rysmambetov.
The advantages of Chinese partners over their European counterparts in Central Asia as often described by experts and politicians in the region, are manifested not so much in "better quality" as in their greater speed, scale, and politically unpretentious approach. For regional elites, this translates into a significant pragmatic advantage, particularly in capital-intensive sectors such as energy, mining, and metallurgy.
“I'd say China wins not because it's better, but because it's packaged differently. The advantages of Chinese partners lie in speed and scale—quick design, fast delivery, and high deadline compliance. Furthermore, Chinese companies are willing to provide immediate financing, and equipment prices are more attractive. Furthermore, Chinese companies are often willing to take on high risks,” says Rysmambetov.
The Chinese cooperation model is built on the rhetoric of non-interference and "win-win," where political demands are marginalized and separated from formal agreements, and the emphasis is on economic benefits and infrastructure connectivity. The European approach is more normative, with funding packages tied to expectations regarding human rights, democratic procedures, anti-corruption reforms, and public procurement transparency, which some elites in Central Asia perceive as unwanted political pressure.
“Chinese capital offers more flexible financial structures than the EU, including resource collateral (providing for projects in the raw materials sector), payment deferrals, and restructuring depending on the recipient country's political and economic situation. European institutions are strictly tied to corporate governance, transparency, and ESG standards, which improves project quality but also reduces their accessibility,” says Marmontova.
According to her, this creates a situation in which China is perceived by regional capitals as a faster, larger-scale, and politically less demanding partner, while Europe offers a higher-quality, but procedurally cumbersome, format of participation.
She also points out to China’s more organised approach to the market. It is building vertical production-processing-export chains, integrating projects in Central Asia into its own industrial ecosystem: from raw material procurement to the supply of semi-finished and finished goods to Chinese and third-party markets. The European presence is often fragmented with individual investments in production, infrastructure, or green technologies not always linked into a single cluster, and some projects are hampered by competing priorities within the EU itself and between member states.
“If Europe sees itself in Central Asia, then it needs more speed, more money, more engineering solutions, and more joint production,” concludes Rysmambetov who does not believe that Chinese companies can squeeze all the others out of Central Asia.
“European companies are strong in high-end technologies, security and governance standards, transparency, talent development, and access to European capital and sales markets. However, the region needs both types of partners, but for different purposes. Therefore, it is unlikely to be a competition,” says Rysmambetov.
Also, the governments of the region are careful not to fall into what could be considered economic dependence.
“The most dangerous risk is a trade imbalance. If imports grow faster than exports, pressure on the balance of payments and the foreign exchange market increases. This is already evident in trade dynamics among major countries. There is also the risk of inauthentic localization. This applies to any partnership—if projects don't create local supply chains, they simply increase the country's dependence on the "investor”. Technologies tied to financing also increase dependence,” says Rysmambetov.