Brussels wants to secure digital infrastructure in the Arctic as melting ice and growing geopolitical tensions turn the polar region into a strategic corridor for trade, communications and security.
The European Union is planning a secure submarine cable linking Greenland directly to Europe, with ambitions to extend the network through Canada to Japan and South Korea, according to a draft Arctic strategy seen by Euronews.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
The project is part of a broader effort to strengthen Europe's digital infrastructure and security in the increasingly contested Arctic region.
"The EU is working on a Pan-Arctic Cable concept that will connect Europe to Japan and South Korea via Greenland and Canada. In the coming years, the EU will connect Greenland to the European Union with a sovereign and secure submarine cable," the document reads.
The plans, outlined in the EU's new Arctic strategy, due to be unveiled on 20 October, reflect growing concerns in Brussels that undersea telecommunications cables have become a matter of strategic security rather than simply commercial infrastructure.
The initiative comes amid a deteriorating security environment in the Arctic, where Russia has expanded its military presence and European governments are increasingly concerned about hybrid threats, including interference with satellite navigation and sabotage of undersea infrastructure.
Meanwhile, growing US interest in Greenland ,has added another layer of geopolitical tension to the region, underlining Europe's concerns about its dependence on infrastructure controlled by others.
The North Atlantic has roughly 17 submarine telecommunications cables, with US technology giants playing a dominant role in the wider infrastructure network.
Submarine cables carry the vast majority of international data traffic, underpinning everything from everyday communications to financial transactions. Their vulnerability to accidental damage or deliberate sabotage has become a major concern for European governments.
For Brussels, improving Arctic connectivity goes beyond bringing faster internet to remote communities. The EU is looking to create more resilient routes for data and reduce exposure to infrastructure that could be disrupted during a geopolitical crisis.
Greenland occupies a particularly sensitive position. Situated between Europe and North America, the autonomous Danish territory has become increasingly important to transatlantic security as competition intensifies over Arctic resources, shipping routes and military access.
A more direct digital connection with Europe could strengthen the territory’s links to the EU while giving Brussels a greater stake in the infrastructure underpinning the region’s future.
"The new submarine cable routes will enhance the access of Arctic communities as well as boost resilience and redundancy in Europe’s digital connectivity. Such connection is a pre-condition for further investments highly relevant for both competitiveness, inclusion, preparedness and defence," reads the document.
The proposed extension towards Asia through Canada would add a broader strategic dimension. Rather than treating Greenland as an isolated connectivity challenge, the EU is considering how Arctic infrastructure might form part of a wider network linking European and Asian economies.
Whether that vision becomes a viable project will depend on technical feasibility, commercial demand, financing and cooperation with Canada and other partners.
Who will pay?
The EU has already earmarked €107 million for connectivity projects involving Greenland, meaning the proposed cable would build on existing commitments rather than represent an entirely new area of investment.
The Commission had presented the idea of co-financing Far North Fibre, a route planning a subsea cable in the Arctic area, to EU member-state representatives. The project was estimated to cost around $1.15 billion, but the project received around €11 million.
The potentially significant development is the prospect of a wider strategic connection between Greenland, Europe and, through Canada, Asian partners.
Such a network would raise difficult questions about who pays for construction, who owns and operates the cables, how they would be protected and whether the route would be commercially viable.
Any extension towards Japan and South Korea would also require agreement and coordination with partners beyond the EU.
However, the strategy does not settle those questions. Nor does it establish a final route, budget or construction schedule for the proposed network.
Still, it mentions creating an Arctic Cable Hub for EU countries, Norway and Iceland, to monitor, protect, and support the repair of submarine cables in the North Atlantic-Arctic. The hub will likely require support from an enhanced icebreaker fleet.
Expanding the icebreaker fleet
The EU's Arctic ambitions extend beyond digital infrastructure to the ships needed to operate in the region's increasingly contested waters.
At the Arctic Summit in September, the EU's special envoy for the region, former Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen, warned of a critical shortfall in European icebreaker capabilities.
“This is not just an issue for Finland, for Norway, for Sweden. This is something for the entire European Union, for the entire European continent. And that's the reason why we are talking about that. And you have my support on that to do that jointly,” German Chancellor Friederik Merz said at the summit’s press conference.
Indeed, the strategy goes in this direction, and vows to put in place an EU Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance meant to map icebreaking needs, available manufacturing capacity in Europe and the technical specifications required.
“The EU, together with member states and like-minded partners, will develop options for joint procurement, pooling and sharing icebreaker capabilities and other capabilities relevant for the Arctic,” reads the strategy.
The intent is to pool together funding and technological resources with Nordic countries and examine whether it is possible to facilitate the operational viability of nationally owned assets, while respecting the national command structure.
The strategy explicitly mentions “assets with special focus on icebreakers for extreme high North environments utilising advanced, high-endurance propulsion systems, including nuclear.”